F X G E W J Q
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
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
WWW.SOFTEK-TOOLCHAINS.COM


POINTER AUTHENTICATION ABI + ELF-BASED PLATFORMS


ANTON KOROBEYNIKOV














SUBSTITUTION ATTACKS




SUBSTITUTION ATTACKS



POINTER AUTHENTICATION



HOW DOES IT WORK?



POINTER AUTHENTICATION: ISA

- Armv8.3: signed pointers
 - Additional changes in Armv8.5 and Armv8.6
- Overall: 48 instructions
 - Some of them in HINT space: nops are on older CPU cores

ISA VS HIGH-LEVEL-LANGUAGES

PACxx

AUTxx


XPACxx

ISA VS HIGH-LEVEL-LANGUAGES

```
PACXX
AUTXX vs
XPACXX
```

```
class B : public A {
public:
    void foo() const override;
    void bar() const override;
};
int test(const A &obj) {
    obj.bar();
    return 0;
}
```

ISA VS HIGH-LEVEL-LANGUAGES




POINTER AUTHENTICATION C++ ABI

- Developed by Apple to use on Mac hardware
- Presented on LLVM US Developers Meeting 2019
 - arm64e: An ABI for Pointer Authentication Ahmed Bougacha, John McCall
- Available as arm64e architecture since Apple A12 (~2018)
- Until recently was only available in Apple downstream clang fork.

ELEMENTS OF C++ PAUTH ABI

Sources of indirect branches:

- returns
- switches
- symbol imports (GOT)
- C function pointers
- C++ virtual functions
- C++ member pointers
- static object constructors
- computed gotos
- •



ABI rule (signing scheme) specifies key and how to compute the modifier

DIVERSITY

- Armv8.3 allows arbitrary 64-bit modifiers to be used
- Address diversity: can use storage address of a pointer as modifier
 - Copying of pointer requires resigning
- Semantic diversity: can use semantics of the pointed code/data as a modifier
 - Derived from declaration, type, or particular usage ...
- Top 16 bits of address is usually reserved
 - Can combine address and semantic diversity (small constant discriminator)

PAUTH + ELF

- PAuth ABI Extension to ELF for the Arm® 64-bit Architecture (pauthabielf64)
 - Currently in Alpha state
 - https://github.com/ARM-software/abi-aa/blob/main/pauthabielf64/pauthabielf64.rst
- Set of ELF-specific relocations & relocation operations
- Marking schema
 - Entry in .note.gnu.property section
- Platform decisions
 - RELRO GOT
 - PLT GOT signing

LLVM 19: STATUS

- The majority of required frontend patches were ported from Apple clang
 - Thanks to Ahmed, John, Akira, Oliver et al!
- Generic pauth codegen support ported from Apple clang
- Implemented ELF-specific pauth codegen
- Implemented object file & linker support for pauth relocations
- Added experimental pauthtest ABI for AArch64/Linux

LLVM testsuite passes on AArch64/Linux with pauthtest ABI

PAUTHTEST

- ABI to test pointer authentication on AArch64 Linux
- Mostly follows Apple arm64e for signing schema, etc.
- Enable via -mabi=pauthtest or pauthest environment in target triple (e.g. aarch64-gnu-linux-pauthtest)
 - -mabi is normalized to environment in triple, similar to eabihf on 32-bit ARM.
- ELF marking:
 - "LLVM Linux" test vendor (0x10000002)
 - Encodes entire signing schema in place of version making catching mismatches easier
- Requires pauth-enabled standard library

KNOWN ISSUES

- Few corner cases with no-op casts (mostly around noexcept)
- No diagnostics for some unsupported computed gotos (code will crash though)
- libunwind might materialize pointers in not very secure way across exceptions being thrown
- Enabling pauth for platform is manual: no hooks for signing schema, etc.

TBD

- PRs under review
 - Signed GOT support
 - TLS support
- ptrauth qualifier
 - See RFC: https://discourse.llvm.org/t/rfc-ptrauth-qualifier/
- Optimizations & relaxations
 - Some already available in Apple downstream tree
- Some code unification & cleanup
- Documentation!

NEW PLATFORM

- Pointer Authentication ABI is an ABI:
 - Cannot safely mix code that uses different ABIs
- Could be deployed on bare-metal platform as default ABI
- Could be deployed on commodity platform as an isolated part
 - OS kernel
 - System-critical process

COMPONENTS OF PAUTH SUPPORT

- Kernel support
- Signing schema
- Marking and versioning
- Runtime libraries

KERNEL SUPPORT

- Key allocation & management
 - Set of 5 128-bit keys
 - Some of them are expected to be process-dependent
- Key preservation during context switches
- Protect values of X16 / X17
- Do you have fork()?

SIGNING SCHEMA

- Lots of variations and customizations in signing scheme:
 - Discriminator usage
 - Objects to sign, etc.
- Every variation effectively defines a new ABI
- Cannot safely mix code that uses different ABIs
- Default set (aka arm64e or pauthtest) is good enough to start
 - Decide about function pointer type discrimination

Do you want to expose all options and knobs that may change ABI?

VERSION & MARKING

https://github.com/ARM-software/abi-aa/blob/main/pauthabielf64/pauthabielf64.rst#elf-marking

- Uses .note.gnu.property section
 - Need to define platform
 - Need to define ABI version
- Might want to encode some additional metadata in the version
- See if base compatibility mode is enough for platform's purposes

Both static linker and dynamic loader are expected to check ABI compatibility

LIBRARIES

- Compiler runtime:
 - libc++, libunwind and compiler-rt should work out of the box
- Dynamic loader:
 - Support for pauth relocations
 - Shared libraries, lazy symbol resolution and interop with unsigned code
 - GOT and PLT GOT choices
- C standard library:
 - Static constructors / destructors (including e.g. atexit)
 - setjmp / longjmp
 - signals

TESTING

- Testing security-related code is non-trivial
 - Matching for expected code sequences
 - Checking final binaries
- Crashing testsuite
 - Try to perform a pointer substitution in different contexts
 - PAuth works: substitution fails => test crashes
 - PAuth does not work: substitution success => no crash
 - WIP, to be released soon
- Maybe a way to extend BOLT-based analysis tools?
 - EuroLLVM 2024: Does LLVM implement security hardenings correctly? A BOLT-based static analyzer to the rescue? *Kristof Beyls*

Q & A