

# JSIR

## Adversarial JavaScript Analysis with MLIR



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<https://github.com/google/jsir>

# Malicious JavaScript appears everywhere



Web pages



Mobile apps



Browser extensions

# Motivating Examples

# Example 1: steganography

```
var imageData = ctx.getImageData(...);
var modMessage = someTransformFrom(imageData);
var message = "";
var charCode = 0;
var bitCount = 0;
var mask = Math.pow(2, codeUnitSize) - 1;
for (var i = 0; i < modMessage.length; i += 1) {
    charCode += modMessage[i] << bitCount;
    bitCount += t;
    if (bitCount >= codeUnitSize) {
        message += String.fromCharCode(charCode & mask);
        bitCount %= codeUnitSize;
        charCode = modMessage[i] >> (t-bitCount);
    }
}
if (charCode !== 0)
    message += String.fromCharCode(charCode & mask);
eval(message);
```

<https://github.com/petereigenschink/steganography.js/blob/master/src/decode.js>

# Example 1: steganography

```
var imageData = ctx.getImageData(...);  
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        bitCount %= codeUnitSize;  
        charCode = modMessage[i] >> (t-bitCount);  
    }  
}  
if (charCode !== 0)  
    message += String.fromCharCode(charCode & mask);  
eval(message);
```

Getting data from an image.

## Malicious behavior: steganography

- Hiding information in an image.
- There are automatic tools to encode and decode.

eval() is usually evil().

<https://github.com/petereigenschink/steganography.js/blob/master/src/decode.js>



# Example 1: steganography

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eval(message);
```

## Solution: Taint Analysis

- Taint analysis: dataflow analysis to discover suspicious information flows.
- Example:
  - Source: getImageData(...)
  - Sink: eval(...)

<https://github.com/petereigenschink/steganography.js/blob/master/src/decode.js>



# Example 1: steganography

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    }
}
if (charCode !== 0)
    message += String.fromCharCode(charCode & mas);
eval(message);
```

The diagram illustrates the flow of variables from the source code to the sink. The source code is as follows:

```
var imageData = ctx.getImageData(...);  
var modMessage = someTransformFrom(imageData);  
var message = "";  
var charCode = 0;  
var bitCount = 0;  
var mask = Math.pow(2, codeUnitSize) - 1;  
for (var i = 0; i < modMessage.length; i += 1) {  
    charCode += modMessage[i] << bitCount;  
    bitCount += t;  
    if (bitCount >= codeUnitSize) {  
        message += String.fromCharCode(charCode & mask);  
        bitCount %= codeUnitSize;  
        charCode = modMessage[i] >> (t-bitCount);  
    }  
}  
if (charCode !== 0)  
    message += String.fromCharCode(charCode & mask);  
eval(message);
```

The sink is located at the bottom of the code, where `eval(message)` is highlighted in yellow. Arrows point from the variable names in the source code to their corresponding values in the sink. The sink value is enclosed in a large brace, indicating it contains multiple occurrences of the source variables.

## Variables tainted by source

# Taint Analysis

A forward dataflow analysis that marks all variables tainted by the source.

## Requirements: IR, CFG, (ideally) SSA

## Example 2: obfuscation

Original source

```
function concat(a, b) {  
    return a + b;  
}  
console.log(concat("hello, ", "world"));
```

Obfuscated source

```
function concat(_0x172308, _0x422cff) {  
    return _0x172308 + _0x422cff;  
}  
console['log'](concat('hel' + 'lo,' + '\x20', 'wor' + 'ld'));
```

### Malicious behavior: obfuscation

- Obfuscation: intentionally makes code more complex.  
This example: string splitting.
- There are automatic tools to obfuscate code.

<https://obfuscator.io>



## Example 2: obfuscation

Original source

```
function concat(a, b) {  
    return a + b;  
}  
console.log(concat("hello, ", "world"));
```

Obfuscated source

```
function concat(_0x172308, _0x422cff) {  
    return _0x172308 + _0x422cff;  
}  
console['log'](concat('hel' + 'lo,' + '\x20', 'wor' + 'ld'));
```

### Solution: deobfuscation

- Constant propagation - forward dataflow analysis
  - IR, CFG, (ideally) SSA
- We want source-to-source transformation - help reverse engineers
  - Convert transformed IR back to source; untransformed IR should revert to original source. Is this even possible?

<https://obfuscator.io>



# How to balance conflicting requirements?

Used by ↑

Rule-based decision engines

ML classifiers

Reverse engineers

Analysts and manual reviewers

## Signal extraction

Requires ↓

IR + CFG for dataflow analysis

SSA for better performance


## Code simplification

IR + CFG for dataflow analysis

No SSA - too low-level

AST for code generation

# JSIR: JavaScript IR that can be lifted back to the AST



# JSIR Design Tour

# Design issue 1: SSA values

Source	IR	Reconstructed Source?
<pre>1 + 2 + 3;</pre>	<pre>%0 = jsir.numeric_literal {1} %1 = jsir.numeric_literal {2} %2 = jsir.binary_expression {"+"} (%0, %1) %3 = jsir.numeric_literal {3} %4 = jsir.binary_expression {"+"} (%2, %3) jsir.expression_statement (%4)</pre>	<pre>let r0 = 1; let r1 = 2; let r2 = r0 + r1; let r3 = 3; let r4 = r2 + r3; r4;</pre>


Issue: we don't want each SSA value to be lifted to a variable.

# Design issue 1: SSA values

Source	IR	Reconstructed Source?
<pre>1 + 2 + 3;</pre>	<pre>%0 = jsir.numeric_literal {1} %1 = jsir.numeric_literal {2} %2 = jsir.binary_expression {"+"} (%0, %1) %3 = jsir.numeric_literal {3} %4 = jsir.binary_expression {"+"} (%2, %3) jsir.expression_statement (%4)</pre>	<pre>%4;</pre> <pre>graph TD     N4["%4"] --&gt; N2["%2"]     N2 --&gt; N0["%0"]     N2 --&gt; N3["%3"]     N0 --&gt; N1["1"]     N1 --&gt; N2     N1 --&gt; N3     N3 --&gt; N2</pre>


Solution: Recognize “statement” operations and recursively lift.

# Design issue 1: SSA values


Source	IR	Reconstructed Source?
<pre>1 + 2 + 3;</pre> 	<pre>%0 = jsir.numeric_literal {1} %1 = jsir.numeric_literal {2} %2 = jsir.binary_expression {"+"} (%0, %1) %3 = jsir.numeric_literal {3} %4 = jsir.binary_expression {"+"} (%2, %3) jsir.expression_statement (%4)</pre>	<pre>1 + 2 + 3;</pre> 

Solution: Recognize “statement” operations and recursively lift.

# Design issue 2: variables



# Design issue 2: variables



# Design issue 3: control flow structures

Source	Using regions	Using CFG
<pre>... if (cond_1) {     ... } else {     ...     if (cond_2) {         ...     } else {         ...     }     ... }</pre>	<pre>... jshir.if (%cond_1) ({     ... }, {     ...     jshir.if (%cond_2) ({         ...     }, {         ...     }) }) ...</pre>	<pre>... cf.cond_br (%cond_1) [^BB1, ^BB2] ^BB1: ... cf.br [^BB6] ^BB2: ... cf.cond_br (%cond_2) [^BB3, ^BB4] ^BB3: ... cf.br [^BB5] ^BB4: ... cf.br [^BB5] ^BB5: ... cf.br [^BB6] ^BB6: ...</pre>


CFG is useful for dataflow analysis, but how can we lift this back to AST?

# Design issue 3: control flow structures

Source

```
...  
if (cond_1) {  
    ...  
} else {  
    ...  
    if (cond_2) {  
        ...  
    } else {  
        ...  
    }  
    ...  
}
```

Using CFG




# Design issue 3: control flow structures

Source

```
...
if (cond_1) {
    ...
} else {
    ...
    if (cond_2) {
        ...
    } else {
        ...
    }
}
...
}
```

Using CFG




# Design issue 3: control flow structures

## Source

```
...  
if (cond_1) {  
    ...  
} else {  
    ...  
    if (cond_2) {  
        ...  
    } else {  
        ...  
    }  
    ...  
}
```

Create a token for each control flow structure

## Using tokens



# Evaluation

**> 5B**

Real JavaScript samples tested

**> 99.9%**

Succeeded in source  $\rightleftarrows$  AST  $\rightleftarrows$  IR roundtrip  
with same source

# Evaluation

~ 70%

React Native bytecode decompiled

# Design issue 3: control flow structures

## Source

```
...  
if (cond_1) {  
    ...  
} else {  
    ...  
    if (cond_2) {  
        ...  
    } else {  
        ...  
    }  
    ...  
}
```

## Using regions

```
...  
jshir.if (%cond_1) ({  
    ...  
}, {  
    ...  
    jshir.if (%cond_2) ({  
        ...  
    }, {  
        ...  
    })  
})  
...
```

## Using CFG

```
...  
cf.cond_br (%cond_1) [^BB1, ^BB2]  
^BB1:  
...  
cf.br [^BB6]  
^BB2:  
...  
cf.cond_br (%cond_2) [^BB3, ^BB4]  
^BB3:  
...  
cf.br [^BB5]  
^BB4:  
...  
cf.br [^BB5]  
^BB5:  
...  
cf.br [^BB6]  
^BB6:  
...
```

Can we just do region-based dataflow analysis?  
Key issue: support “break” and “continue”

Efficient Data-Flow Analysis on Region-Based Control Flow in MLIR  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vvVR3FyU9TE>

[RFC] Region-based control-flow with early exits in MLIR  
<https://discourse.llvm.org/t/rfc-region-based-control-flow-with-early-exits-in-mlir>

# Takeaways

## Malicious JavaScript

Malicious JavaScript is a prevalent problem

## MLIR to Represent General Purpose Languages

MLIR has much more potential than representing ML programs

## “Reversible” IR Design

It is possible to design an IR that can convert back to AST

# Long-term goals / ideas / visions

- Could a high-level IR completely replace the AST?  
Seems like Mojo is doing something like this  
(<https://discourse.llvm.org/t/rfc-region-based-control-flow-with-early-exits-in-mlir/76998/11>)
- A JavaScript IR standard?  
In other words, it's like ESTree but an IR instead of AST
- An IR-based JavaScript tooling framework?  
In other words, it's like Babel but IR-based
- Check it out! <https://github.com/google/jsir>