

# OJIT: A Novel Secure Remote Execution Technology By Obfuscated Just-In-Time Compilation

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## Vision

- Our work introduces OJIT (Obfuscated Just-In-Time compilation technique); a technique inspired by the “security by obscurity” principles adopted in foist viruses and surreptitious malware design.
- Target securing remote computation platforms such as those in cloud computing.

## Introduction

- The world of computing is now undergoing a major paradigm shift. The unlimited potentials of a connected world have allowed a new form of “remote execution” of programs, where processing of one’s data is done on a physically out of reach computing premise. For example we have cloud computing platforms bundled with thin clients like smartphones.
- Unfortunately, a new breed of cyber threats appeared such as side-channel attacks and cartography. Relying solely on data encryption is not enough, as the decryption software itself runs remotely on the cloud, and therefore security can be compromised.

## The Security Problem In The Cloud

- The dilemma here is how to trust a computing environment that one cannot control.
- We have to invent new security measures to trust that execution will be private and the outcomes are integral.
- Depending solely on cryptography is not sufficient because the decryption itself will be done on untrusted platforms.
- Side-Channel attacks are one of the major threats in the cloud environment.
- The idea behind them is to analyze usage patterns and/or their timing to get information about code behavior.
- Utilize this information to reverse engineer or tamper with the code.
- This attack could be launched by a malicious insider or even a third party impersonator.




Figure 1: Cloud Computing Architecture

## Current Approaches

| Title                                               | Basic Idea                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Critique                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| “Twin Clouds “<br>by Bugiel, et al                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Trusted Private Cloud : for evaluating encrypted security critical data.</li> <li>• Commodity public cloud :for computing time critical queries in parallel under encryption in the query phase.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased the cost of infrastructure.</li> <li>• Hardware cost for encrypted execution “garbled circuit”.</li> <li>• More communication cost among the clouds.</li> </ul>                       |
| “Hypervisor Security “<br>by McCune, et al          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RTM “Root Trust Management”.</li> <li>• Chain of trust.</li> <li>• CA “Certificate Authority”.</li> </ul>                                                                                                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Costly start overhead.</li> <li>• Side-channels attacks.</li> <li>• Certificate authority as a central point of failure.</li> <li>• Sabotage attacks via buffer and memory overflow.</li> </ul> |
| “Secure Virtual Architecture”<br>by Criswell, et al | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Add instructions for memory safety, type safety and control flow integrity.</li> <li>• Monitor all privileged operations.</li> <li>• Control physical resources.</li> </ul>                                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Eavesdropping types of attack.</li> <li>• Focus only on the instruction set beyond the code-generation phases- not utilizing LLVM’s JIT compiler.</li> </ul>                                    |

## Our Approach: Security By Obscurity

- Hiding the purpose, meaning, and operation of the code from attackers either humans or reverse engineering software.
- Gaming security by obscurity utilizing the information imbalance between the end-user and the service provider.
- Compilers offer a vast amount of semantic information which can be utilized for security objectives.
- Fortification and logical complexity together with the dynamic nature of the JIT compiler covers a wide range of attack vectors .
- Continually changing “What”, “When” and perhaps “Where it’s done too”.
- Our focus is on the execution phase against side-channel attacks; we are not currently concerned with securing the JIT compiler itself.

## System Operation



Figure 2: Flow Chart of OJIT System Operation.

- We are currently focusing on JITed code obfuscation.
- *Code morphing* – i.e multi-versioning of the same code with same functionality
- Dynamic switching - Jump around between these ever changing versions
- We modified the Execution Engine of LLVM forcing it to lazily call the JIT compiler every time a function is invoked.
- Every case of recursion is treated as a new function call.
- OJIT mainly works on a function call passes (Trampoline Call) as a trigger for recompiling a piece of code.
- Every function call results in a random order set of transformation passes applied to it.
- We can also extract loops as recursive function calls.
- Thereby we made the entire program as a series of function calls
- A strong random number generator forces unexpected code version “ $O(N^k)$ ”,  $N$  is the no. of transformation, size of pass set.

## Evaluation Metrics

- We selected a concrete set of metrics to evaluate and assess the obfuscation strength of the system.
- We collected information about the number of instructions before and after every obfuscation step.
- We also deduce the cyclomatic number and the knot count to measure the complexity in the Control Flow Graph.
- We introduced a new obfuscation metric to measure how different is every code version as compared to its predecessor during the dynamic code-morphing/obfuscation phase.
- This is expressed in terms of a similarity percentage of the Longest Common Subsequence between the two code versions.

## Experimental Analysis

We tested our system on a recursion intensive program that is the Bzip2 benchmark available in the SPEC CPU 2006 suite.




Figure 3: LCS between successive versions of the various functions of the Bzip2 benchmark.

## Conclusions

- Cloud Computing is now facing what the first banking systems faced: trust issues, privacy concerns and reasonable security doubts.
- Security by Obscurity has been around and misused for some time – we hope to bring the right side.
- By utilizing the dynamic nature of JITed compiler we only hope that we added an insufferable burden on a reverse engineering or tampering malicious insiders.