AArch64PointerAuth.cpp

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//===-- AArch64PointerAuth.cpp -- Harden code using PAuth ------------------==//
//
// Part of the LLVM Project, under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions.
// See https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt for license information.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception
//
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
 
#include "AArch64PointerAuth.h"
 
#include "AArch64.h"
#include "AArch64FrameLowering.h"
#include "AArch64InstrInfo.h"
#include "AArch64MachineFunctionInfo.h"
#include "AArch64RegisterInfo.h"
#include "AArch64Subtarget.h"
#include "MCTargetDesc/AArch64AddressingModes.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/CFIInstBuilder.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/MachineBasicBlock.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/MachineInstrBuilder.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/MachineModuleInfo.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/RegisterScavenging.h"
#include "llvm/IR/Module.h"
 
using namespace llvm;
using namespace llvm::AArch64PAuth;
 
#define AARCH64_POINTER_AUTH_NAME "AArch64 Pointer Authentication"
 
namespace {
 
class AArch64PointerAuthImpl {
public:
  bool run(MachineFunction &MF);
 
private:
  const AArch64Subtarget *Subtarget = nullptr;
  const AArch64InstrInfo *TII = nullptr;
 
  void signLR(MachineFunction &MF, MachineBasicBlock::iterator MBBI) const;
 
  void authenticateLR(MachineFunction &MF,
                      MachineBasicBlock::iterator MBBI) const;
 
  bool emitSignReturnAddressHardening(MachineFunction &MF);
};
 
class AArch64PointerAuthLegacy : public MachineFunctionPass {
public:
  static char ID;
 
  AArch64PointerAuthLegacy() : MachineFunctionPass(ID) {}
 
  bool runOnMachineFunction(MachineFunction &MF) override;
 
  StringRef getPassName() const override { return AARCH64_POINTER_AUTH_NAME; }
};
 
} // end anonymous namespace
 
INITIALIZE_PASS(AArch64PointerAuthLegacy, "aarch64-ptrauth",
                AARCH64_POINTER_AUTH_NAME, false, false)
 
FunctionPass *llvm::createAArch64PointerAuthPass() {
  return new AArch64PointerAuthLegacy();
}
 
char AArch64PointerAuthLegacy::ID = 0;
 
static void emitEpiloguePACSymOffsetIntoReg(const TargetInstrInfo &TII,
                                            MachineBasicBlock &MBB,
                                            MachineBasicBlock::iterator I,
                                            DebugLoc DL, MCSymbol *PACSym,
                                            Register Reg) {
  BuildMI(MBB, I, DL, TII.get(AArch64::ADRP), Reg)
      .addSym(PACSym, AArch64II::MO_PAGE)
      .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
  BuildMI(MBB, I, DL, TII.get(AArch64::ADDXri), Reg)
      .addReg(Reg)
      .addSym(PACSym, AArch64II::MO_PAGEOFF | AArch64II::MO_NC)
      .addImm(0)
      .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
}
 
// Wrap a given PAC instruction in CFI that describes it.
//
// Depending on the type of CFI required, we may need to emit the directive
// either before or after the instruction, so that unwinders can correctly
// interpret the location of the signing instruction.
//
// As a general rule, CFI opcodes describe the actions needed to recover the
// register state leading up to a not-yet-retired instruction, with one
// exception: .cfi_negate_ra_state_with_pc always comes before the paci[ab]sppc,
// since the unwinder uses the location of the CFI itself to derive the address
// of the signing instruction [1].
// 1: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/137795#issuecomment-2838779129
template <typename BuildPACMIFn>
static void decoratePACWithCFI(MachineBasicBlock &MBB,
                               MachineBasicBlock::iterator MBBI, bool EmitCFI,
                               BuildPACMIFn BuildPACMI) {
  if (!EmitCFI) {
    BuildPACMI();
    return;
  }
 
  auto &MF = *MBB.getParent();
  auto &MFnI = *MF.getInfo<AArch64FunctionInfo>();
  CFIInstBuilder CFIBuilder(MBB, MBBI, MachineInstr::FrameSetup);
  const Triple &TT = MF.getFunction().getParent()->getTargetTriple();
  SetRAStateMode Mode = MF.getSubtarget<AArch64Subtarget>()
                            .getCLOpts()
                            .cfi_llvm_set_ra_sign_state;
 
  if (MFnI.branchProtectionPAuthLR()) {
    switch (Mode) {
    case SetRAStateMode::Never:
      CFIBuilder.buildNegateRAStateWithPC();
      BuildPACMI();
      break;
    case SetRAStateMode::PAuthLR:
    case SetRAStateMode::Always: {
      BuildPACMI();
      MCSymbol *PACSym = MFnI.getSigningInstrLabel();
      assert(PACSym && "No PAC instruction to refer to");
      CFIBuilder.buildSetRAState(2, PACSym);
      break;
    }
    }
  } else {
    switch (Mode) {
    case SetRAStateMode::Never:
    case SetRAStateMode::PAuthLR:
      BuildPACMI();
      if (!TT.isOSBinFormatMachO()) {
        CFIBuilder.buildNegateRAState();
      }
      break;
    case SetRAStateMode::Always:
      BuildPACMI();
      CFIBuilder.buildSetRAState(1, nullptr);
      break;
    }
  }
}
 
static void emitAUTCFI(MachineBasicBlock &MBB, MachineBasicBlock::iterator MBBI,
                       bool EmitCFI) {
  if (!EmitCFI)
    return;
 
  auto &MF = *MBB.getParent();
  auto &MFnI = *MF.getInfo<AArch64FunctionInfo>();
  CFIInstBuilder CFIBuilder(MBB, MBBI, MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
  const Triple &TT = MF.getFunction().getParent()->getTargetTriple();
  SetRAStateMode Mode = MF.getSubtarget<AArch64Subtarget>()
                            .getCLOpts()
                            .cfi_llvm_set_ra_sign_state;
 
  if (MFnI.branchProtectionPAuthLR()) {
    switch (Mode) {
    case SetRAStateMode::Never:
      // DW_CFA_AARCH64_negate_ra_state_with_pc is semantically broken for
      // functions where shrinkwrapping places signing/authenticating pairs on
      // distinct CFG paths.
      //
      // DWARF CFI is evaluated linearly over the byte stream, not along control
      // flow edges. The toggle semantics of this directive therefore cannot
      // faithfully represent the signed/unsigned RA state for all possible CFG
      // paths. The added complexity versus DW_CFA_AARCH64_negate_ra_state is
      // that an unwinder must also reconstruct the PC of the PACI[AB]SPPC in
      // order to verify the signed LR, and that address is derived from the
      // location of this directive in the linear CFI stream.
      //
      // The correct fix is to use DW_CFA_AARCH64_set_ra_state_with_pc, which
      // sets the RA state and signing address absolutely rather than toggling
      // them. An unwinder that supports this directive can reconstruct the
      // correct state on any CFG path, regardless of how many
      // signing/authenticating pairs exist in the function. However, not all
      // unwinders support this directive, so we cannot rely on it exclusively.
      //
      // For unwinders that only support DW_CFA_AARCH64_negate_ra_state_with_pc,
      // libunwind exploits a loophole: it records the address at the
      // DW_CFA_AARCH64_negate_ra_state_with_pc site to authenticate the LR, but
      // does not care that the CFI state remains "signed with pc" after
      // authentication has occurred. This means we can safely omit the
      // FrameDestroy emission of this directive, treating it solely as a marker
      // for the signing site, as long as each function has at most one such
      // signing location. That invariant holds today because shrinkwrapping
      // does not yet hoist or sink PAuth_LR frame code across CFG join/split
      // points; once it does, we must avoid those transformations on platforms
      // that have this limitation.
      //
      // https://github.com/ARM-software/abi-aa/issues/327
      // https://github.com/ARM-software/abi-aa/pull/346
      break;
    case SetRAStateMode::PAuthLR:
    case SetRAStateMode::Always:
      CFIBuilder.buildSetRAState(0, nullptr);
      break;
    }
  } else if (!TT.isOSBinFormatMachO()) {
    switch (Mode) {
    case SetRAStateMode::Never:
    case SetRAStateMode::PAuthLR:
      CFIBuilder.buildNegateRAState();
      break;
    case SetRAStateMode::Always:
      CFIBuilder.buildSetRAState(0, nullptr);
      break;
    }
  }
}
 
static inline void emitMOVWithFrameDestroy(MachineBasicBlock &MBB,
                                           MachineBasicBlock::iterator &MBBI,
                                           DebugLoc DL,
                                           const AArch64InstrInfo *TII,
                                           Register Dst, Register Src) {
  assert(&MBB == MBBI->getParent());
  BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII->get(AArch64::ORRXrs), Dst)
      .addReg(AArch64::XZR)
      .addReg(Src)
      .addImm(0)
      .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
}
 
void AArch64PointerAuthImpl::signLR(MachineFunction &MF,
                                    MachineBasicBlock::iterator MBBI) const {
  auto &MFnI = *MF.getInfo<AArch64FunctionInfo>();
  bool UseBKey = MFnI.shouldSignWithBKey();
  bool EmitCFI = MFnI.needsDwarfUnwindInfo(MF);
  bool NeedsWinCFI = MF.hasWinCFI();
 
  MachineBasicBlock &MBB = *MBBI->getParent();
 
  // Debug location must be unknown, see AArch64FrameLowering::emitPrologue.
  DebugLoc DL;
 
  if (UseBKey && !MF.getTarget().getTargetTriple().isOSBinFormatMachO()) {
    BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII->get(AArch64::EMITBKEY))
        .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameSetup);
  }
 
  // PAuthLR authentication instructions need to know the value of PC at the
  // point of signing (PACI*).
  if (MFnI.branchProtectionPAuthLR()) {
    MCSymbol *PACSym = MF.getContext().createTempSymbol();
    MFnI.setSigningInstrLabel(PACSym);
  }
 
  // No SEH opcode for this one; it doesn't materialize into an
  // instruction on Windows.
  if (MFnI.branchProtectionPAuthLR() && Subtarget->hasPAuthLR()) {
    decoratePACWithCFI(MBB, MBBI, EmitCFI, [&]() {
      BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL,
              TII->get(UseBKey ? AArch64::PACIBSPPC : AArch64::PACIASPPC))
          .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameSetup)
          ->setPreInstrSymbol(MF, MFnI.getSigningInstrLabel());
    });
  } else {
    if (MFnI.branchProtectionPAuthLR()) {
      BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII->get(AArch64::PACM))
          .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameSetup);
    }
    decoratePACWithCFI(MBB, MBBI, EmitCFI, [&]() {
      BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL,
              TII->get(UseBKey ? AArch64::PACIBSP : AArch64::PACIASP))
          .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameSetup)
          ->setPreInstrSymbol(MF, MFnI.getSigningInstrLabel());
    });
  }
 
  if (!EmitCFI && NeedsWinCFI) {
    assert(UseBKey &&
           "Windows SEH PAC unwind info only supports B-key signing");
    BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII->get(AArch64::SEH_PACSignLR))
        .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameSetup);
  }
}
 
void AArch64PointerAuthImpl::authenticateLR(
    MachineFunction &MF, MachineBasicBlock::iterator MBBI) const {
  const AArch64FunctionInfo *MFnI = MF.getInfo<AArch64FunctionInfo>();
  bool UseBKey = MFnI->shouldSignWithBKey();
  bool EmitAsyncCFI = MFnI->needsAsyncDwarfUnwindInfo(MF);
  bool NeedsWinCFI = MF.hasWinCFI();
 
  MachineBasicBlock &MBB = *MBBI->getParent();
  DebugLoc DL = MBBI->getDebugLoc();
  // MBBI points to a PAUTH_EPILOGUE instruction to be replaced and
  // TI points to a terminator instruction that may or may not be combined.
  // Note that inserting new instructions "before MBBI" and "before TI" is
  // not the same because if ShadowCallStack is enabled, its instructions
  // are placed between MBBI and TI.
  MachineBasicBlock::iterator TI = MBB.getFirstInstrTerminator();
 
  MCSymbol *PACSym = MFnI->getSigningInstrLabel();
  auto &AFL = *static_cast<const AArch64FrameLowering *>(
      MF.getSubtarget().getFrameLowering());
  int64_t ArgumentStackToRestore = AFL.getArgumentStackToRestore(MF, MBB);
 
  // The AUTIASP instruction assembles to a hint instruction before v8.3a so
  // this instruction can safely be used for any v8a architecture.
  // From v8.3a onwards there are optimised authenticate LR and return
  // instructions, namely RETA{A,B}, that can be used instead. In this case
  // the DW_CFA_AARCH64_negate_ra_state can't be emitted. Additionally,
  // RET{A,B} requires the SP to match its incoming value on entry to the
  // function.
  //
  // If the PAC-RET hardening based on load from the return address is
  // enabled, fallback to the use of AUTIASP/AUTIBSP and RET.
  bool TerminatorIsCombinable = std::next(MBBI) == TI && TI != MBB.end() &&
                                TI->getOpcode() == AArch64::RET &&
                                ArgumentStackToRestore == 0 &&
                                !MFnI->shouldHardenSignReturnAddress();
 
  if (Subtarget->hasPAuth() && TerminatorIsCombinable && !NeedsWinCFI &&
      !MF.getFunction().hasFnAttribute(Attribute::ShadowCallStack)) {
    if (MFnI->branchProtectionPAuthLR() && Subtarget->hasPAuthLR()) {
      assert(PACSym && "No PAC instruction to refer to");
      BuildMI(MBB, TI, DL,
              TII->get(UseBKey ? AArch64::RETABSPPCi : AArch64::RETAASPPCi))
          .addSym(PACSym)
          .copyImplicitOps(*MBBI)
          .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
    } else {
      if (MFnI->branchProtectionPAuthLR()) {
        emitEpiloguePACSymOffsetIntoReg(*TII, MBB, MBBI, DL, PACSym,
                                        AArch64::X16);
        BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII->get(AArch64::PACM))
            .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
      }
      BuildMI(MBB, TI, DL, TII->get(UseBKey ? AArch64::RETAB : AArch64::RETAA))
          .copyImplicitOps(*MBBI)
          .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
    }
    MBB.erase(TI);
    return;
  }
 
  // If PAUTH_EPILOGUE is at insertion point with a net zero offset on SP, we
  // can use an AUT form with a hardcoded SP discriminator.
  if (ArgumentStackToRestore == 0) {
    if (MFnI->branchProtectionPAuthLR() && Subtarget->hasPAuthLR()) {
      assert(PACSym && "No PAC instruction to refer to");
      BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL,
              TII->get(UseBKey ? AArch64::AUTIBSPPCi : AArch64::AUTIASPPCi))
          .addSym(PACSym)
          .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
      emitAUTCFI(MBB, MBBI, EmitAsyncCFI);
    } else {
      if (MFnI->branchProtectionPAuthLR()) {
        emitEpiloguePACSymOffsetIntoReg(*TII, MBB, MBBI, DL, PACSym,
                                        AArch64::X16);
 
        BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII->get(AArch64::PACM))
            .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
      }
      BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL,
              TII->get(UseBKey ? AArch64::AUTIBSP : AArch64::AUTIASP))
          .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
      emitAUTCFI(MBB, MBBI, EmitAsyncCFI);
    }
 
    if (NeedsWinCFI) {
      assert(UseBKey &&
             "Windows SEH PAC unwind info only supports B-key signing");
      BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII->get(AArch64::SEH_PACSignLR))
          .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
    }
 
    return;
  }
 
  // When ArgumentStackToRestore > 0, this function received more argument
  // space than the tail callee pops. The epilogue contains an SP adjustment
  // (e.g. "add sp, sp, #N") to discard the leftover argument space.
  //
  // When ArgumentStackToRestore < 0, the tail callee pops more argument space
  // than this function received, so after the frame teardown, SP is below the
  // entry SP used as the signing modifier.
  //
  // We cannot simply bump SP first and then use AUTI[AB]SP with the bumped
  // value, because the live arguments would fall below SP and potentially
  // outside the red-zone.
  //
  // At this point there is an offset to the incoming SP, and we can't use the
  // aut variants that hard-code SP. Reconstruct entry SP in x16 and
  // authenticate using AUTI[AB]1716 (x17=LR, x16=entry_SP).
  emitFrameOffset(MBB, MBBI, DL, AArch64::X16, AArch64::SP,
                  StackOffset::getFixed(-ArgumentStackToRestore), TII,
                  MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
 
  if (MFnI->branchProtectionPAuthLR() && Subtarget->hasPAuthLR()) {
    emitMOVWithFrameDestroy(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII, AArch64::X17, AArch64::LR);
 
    assert(PACSym && "No PAC instruction to refer to");
    emitEpiloguePACSymOffsetIntoReg(*TII, MBB, MBBI, DL, PACSym, AArch64::X15);
 
    unsigned AutOpc = UseBKey ? AArch64::AUTIB171615 : AArch64::AUTIA171615;
    BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII->get(AutOpc))
        .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
    emitAUTCFI(MBB, MBBI, EmitAsyncCFI);
 
    emitMOVWithFrameDestroy(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII, AArch64::LR, AArch64::X17);
  } else if (MFnI->branchProtectionPAuthLR()) {
    emitMOVWithFrameDestroy(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII, AArch64::X17, AArch64::LR);
 
    assert(PACSym && "No PAC instruction to refer to");
    emitEpiloguePACSymOffsetIntoReg(*TII, MBB, MBBI, DL, PACSym, AArch64::X15);
 
    // The PACM hint-space instruction modifies the following AUTI[AB]1716
    // to optionally take x15 as an extra operand depending on the
    // presence of +pauth-lr at runtime. On machines without +pauth-lr, it
    // behaves as a nop, and the address of the PACI[AB]SP in x15 is
    // ignored.
    BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII->get(AArch64::PACM))
        .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
 
    unsigned AutOpc = UseBKey ? AArch64::AUTIB1716 : AArch64::AUTIA1716;
    BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII->get(AutOpc))
        .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
    emitAUTCFI(MBB, MBBI, EmitAsyncCFI);
 
    emitMOVWithFrameDestroy(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII, AArch64::LR, AArch64::X17);
  } else if (Subtarget->hasPAuth()) {
    BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII->get(UseBKey ? AArch64::AUTIB : AArch64::AUTIA),
            AArch64::LR)
        .addUse(AArch64::LR)
        .addUse(AArch64::X16)
        .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
    emitAUTCFI(MBB, MBBI, EmitAsyncCFI);
  } else {
    emitMOVWithFrameDestroy(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII, AArch64::X17, AArch64::LR);
 
    unsigned AutOpc = UseBKey ? AArch64::AUTIB1716 : AArch64::AUTIA1716;
    BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII->get(AutOpc))
        .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
    emitAUTCFI(MBB, MBBI, EmitAsyncCFI);
 
    emitMOVWithFrameDestroy(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII, AArch64::LR, AArch64::X17);
  }
 
  if (NeedsWinCFI) {
    assert(UseBKey &&
           "Windows SEH PAC unwind info only supports B-key signing");
    BuildMI(MBB, MBBI, DL, TII->get(AArch64::SEH_PACSignLR))
        .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
  }
}
 
unsigned llvm::AArch64PAuth::getCheckerSizeInBytes(AuthCheckMethod Method) {
  switch (Method) {
  case AuthCheckMethod::None:
    return 0;
  case AuthCheckMethod::DummyLoad:
    return 4;
  case AuthCheckMethod::HighBitsNoTBI:
    return 12;
  case AuthCheckMethod::XPACHint:
  case AuthCheckMethod::XPAC:
    return 20;
  }
  llvm_unreachable("Unknown AuthCheckMethod enum");
}
 
bool AArch64PointerAuthImpl::run(MachineFunction &MF) {
  Subtarget = &MF.getSubtarget<AArch64Subtarget>();
  TII = Subtarget->getInstrInfo();
 
  SmallVector<MachineBasicBlock::instr_iterator> PAuthPseudoInstrs;
 
  bool Modified = false;
 
  for (auto &MBB : MF) {
    for (auto &MI : MBB) {
      switch (MI.getOpcode()) {
      default:
        break;
      case AArch64::PAUTH_PROLOGUE:
      case AArch64::PAUTH_EPILOGUE:
        PAuthPseudoInstrs.push_back(MI.getIterator());
        break;
      }
    }
  }
 
  for (auto It : PAuthPseudoInstrs) {
    switch (It->getOpcode()) {
    case AArch64::PAUTH_PROLOGUE:
      signLR(MF, It);
      break;
    case AArch64::PAUTH_EPILOGUE:
      authenticateLR(MF, It);
      break;
    default:
      llvm_unreachable("Unhandled opcode");
    }
    It->eraseFromParent();
    Modified = true;
  }
 
  Modified |= emitSignReturnAddressHardening(MF);
 
  return Modified;
}
 
bool AArch64PointerAuthImpl::emitSignReturnAddressHardening(
    MachineFunction &MF) {
  const auto *FI = MF.getInfo<AArch64FunctionInfo>();
  assert(FI && "FI can't be null");
  if (!FI->shouldSignReturnAddress(MF) || !FI->shouldHardenSignReturnAddress())
    return false;
  assert(Subtarget && "Subtarget must be initialized");
 
  RegScavenger RS;
  bool Modified = false;
  for (MachineBasicBlock &MBB : MF) {
    MachineBasicBlock::iterator RetInstIter = MBB.getFirstTerminator();
 
    if (RetInstIter == MBB.end() || RetInstIter->getOpcode() != AArch64::RET)
      continue;
 
    assert(RetInstIter->getOperand(0).getReg() == AArch64::LR &&
           "Return instruction must be returning via LR");
 
    MachineBasicBlock::iterator InsertionPoint = RetInstIter;
    // In the case of Windows SEH, the hardening sequence does not immediately
    // precede the return instruction. Instead, it precedes the SEH_EpilogEnd
    // pseudo-instruction, which itself is expected to be the predecessor of
    // the return. Plus, each instruction in the sequence needs one SEH_Nop.
    const bool NeedsWinCFI = MF.hasWinCFI();
    if (NeedsWinCFI) {
      --InsertionPoint;
      assert(InsertionPoint->getOpcode() == AArch64::SEH_EpilogEnd);
    }
    DebugLoc DL = InsertionPoint->getDebugLoc();
    const auto EmitSEHNopIfRequired = [&]() {
      if (NeedsWinCFI)
        BuildMI(MBB, InsertionPoint, DL, TII->get(AArch64::SEH_Nop))
            .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
    };
 
    RS.enterBasicBlockEnd(MBB);
    Register XReg = RS.scavengeRegisterBackwards(
        AArch64::GPR64RegClass, InsertionPoint,
        /*RestoreAfter=*/false, /*SPAdj=*/0, /*AllowSpill=*/false);
    if (XReg == AArch64::NoRegister) {
      // Couldn't find a free register to use for the hardening. Skip.
      MF.getContext().reportWarning(
          SMLoc(), "harden-pac-ret failed for function " + MF.getName());
      continue;
    }
 
    // Register copies are done using ORRXrs directly instead of using the
    // pseudo-instruction COPY because this function can be called after
    // pseudo-instruction expansion takes place, for example via the machine
    // outliner pass.
    emitMOVWithFrameDestroy(MBB, InsertionPoint, DL, TII, XReg, AArch64::LR);
    EmitSEHNopIfRequired();
 
    // The XPACI instruction is only available with FEAT_PAUTH. So if the
    // subtarget does not have it, the alternative XPACLRI instruction must be
    // used instead. The latter is in hint space, therefore can be used even
    // if FEAT_PAUTH is absent.
    if (Subtarget->hasPAuth()) {
      BuildMI(MBB, InsertionPoint, DL, TII->get(AArch64::XPACI), XReg)
          .addUse(XReg)
          .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
      EmitSEHNopIfRequired();
      Register WReg =
          Subtarget->getRegisterInfo()->getSubReg(XReg, AArch64::sub_32);
      BuildMI(MBB, InsertionPoint, DL, TII->get(AArch64::LDRWui), WReg)
          .addUse(XReg)
          .addImm(0)
          .addMemOperand(MF.getMachineMemOperand(
              MachinePointerInfo(),
              MachineMemOperand::MOLoad | MachineMemOperand::MOVolatile, 4,
              Align(4)))
          .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
      EmitSEHNopIfRequired();
    } else {
      // Emit a CFI directive to tell unwinders that the return address is now
      // saved in XReg.
      CFIInstBuilder(MBB, InsertionPoint, MachineInstr::FrameDestroy)
          .buildRegister(AArch64::LR, XReg);
      BuildMI(MBB, InsertionPoint, DL, TII->get(AArch64::XPACLRI))
          .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
      EmitSEHNopIfRequired();
      BuildMI(MBB, InsertionPoint, DL, TII->get(AArch64::LDRWui), AArch64::W30)
          .addUse(AArch64::LR)
          .addImm(0)
          .addMemOperand(MF.getMachineMemOperand(
              MachinePointerInfo(),
              MachineMemOperand::MOLoad | MachineMemOperand::MOVolatile, 4,
              Align(4)))
          .setMIFlag(MachineInstr::FrameDestroy);
      EmitSEHNopIfRequired();
      BuildMI(MBB, RetInstIter, DL, TII->get(AArch64::RET))
          .addUse(XReg)
          .copyImplicitOps(*RetInstIter);
      MBB.erase(RetInstIter);
    }
    Modified = true;
  }
 
  return Modified;
}
 
bool AArch64PointerAuthLegacy::runOnMachineFunction(MachineFunction &MF) {
  return AArch64PointerAuthImpl().run(MF);
}
 
PreservedAnalyses
AArch64PointerAuthPass::run(MachineFunction &MF,
                            MachineFunctionAnalysisManager &MFAM) {
  const bool Changed = AArch64PointerAuthImpl().run(MF);
  if (!Changed)
    return PreservedAnalyses::all();
  PreservedAnalyses PA = getMachineFunctionPassPreservedAnalyses();
  PA.preserveSet<CFGAnalyses>();
  return PA;
}